In the meantime, the status quo has been made more bearable thanks to the architects of the peace process, who have spent billions to prop up the Palestinian government, create conditions of prosperity for decision-makers in Ramallah, and dissuade the population from confronting the occupying force.
Israel, Palestine part of conflict its part, has consistently opted for stalemate rather than the sort of agreement outlined above. The reason is obvious: The damages Israel would risk incurring through such an accord are massive. There could also be bloodshed during forcible evacuations of West Bank settlements and rifts within the body implementing the evictions, the Israeli army, whose share of religious infantry officers now surpasses one third.
Israel would lose military control over the West Bank, resulting in less intelligence-gathering, less room for manoeuvre in future wars, and less time to react to a surprise attack. Israeli intelligence services would no longer control which Palestinians enter and exit the occupied territories.
But chief among them would be the blow dealt to efforts to delegitimise Israel and the normalisation of relations with other nations of the region. Israeli businesses would be able to operate more openly in Arab states, and government cooperation with such countries as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would go from covert to overt.
Through a treaty with the Palestinians, Israel could attain the relocation of every Tel Aviv embassy to Jerusalem, and receive additional financial and security benefits from the US and Europe.
But all of these combined do not come close to outweighing the deficits. Nor have the moral costs of occupation for Israeli society been high enough to change the calculus.
For all the recent fretting about decreasing American Jewish support for Israel, the conversation today is not so different than it was at the time of the first Likud-led governments decades ago.
Similarly enduring — and endurable — are the worries that occupation delegitimises Zionism and causes discord within Israel.
|Early Bronze Age||Don't learn about the history of the conflict or about statistics or numerical details from this book however, as there are numerous blatant errors due to carelessness in editing or ignorance.|
Israelis have grown adept at tuning such criticisms out. It was, is, and will remain irrational for Israel to absorb the costs of an agreement when the price of the alternative is so comparatively low.
The consequences of choosing impasse are hardly threatening: Israel will go on absorbing the annoying but so-far tolerable costs of complaints about settlement policies. And it will likely witness several more countries bestowing the State of Palestine with symbolic recognition, a few more negative votes in impotent university student councils, limited calls for boycotts of settlement goods, and occasional bursts of violence that the greatly overpowered Palestinians are too weak to sustain.
There is no contest. The real explanation for the past decades of failed peace negotiations is not mistaken tactics or imperfect circumstances, but that no strategy can succeed if it is premised on Israel behaving irrationally. Most arguments put to Israel for agreeing to a partition are that it is preferable to an imagined, frightening future in which the country ceases to be either a Jewish state or a democracy, or both.
Israel is constantly warned that if it does not soon decide to grant Palestinians citizenship or sovereignty, it will become, at some never-defined future date, an apartheid state. But these assertions contain the implicit acknowledgment that it makes no sense for Israel to strike a deal today rather than wait to see if such imagined threats actually materialise.
If and when they do come to be, Israel can then make a deal.
Or, perhaps, the West Bank will be absorbed by Jordan, and Gaza by Egypt, a better outcome than Palestinian statehood, in the view of many Israeli officials. It is hard to argue that forestalling an agreement in the present makes a worse deal more likely in the future: Israel has continued to reject the same Palestinian claims made since the s, albeit with a few added Palestinian concessions.
In fact, history suggests that a strategy of waiting would serve the country well: Israel could instead wait until that day comes, and thereby enjoy many more years of West Bank control and the security advantages that go with it — particularly valuable at a time of cataclysm in the region.A Synopsis of the Israel/Palestine Conflict.
The following is a very short synopsis of the history of this conflict. We recommend that you also read the much more detailed account, "The Origin of the Palestine-Israel Conflict." I write about it because I was a part of it.”. Palestine Facts is dedicated to providing comprehensive and accurate information regarding the historical, military, and political background to the on-going struggle between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.
The conflict between Israel and Palestine can often seem like a permanent feature of the global order. The wars, intifadas, refugees camps, suicide vests, UN resolutions, and peace talks have been painfully burned into our collective consciousness. Palestine, area of the eastern Mediterranean region, comprising parts of modern Israel and the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip (along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea) and the West Bank (the area west of the Jordan River)..
The term Palestine has been associated variously and sometimes controversially with this small region, which some have asserted also includes Jordan.
Now in its third edition, James L. Gelvin's The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War is a balanced, compelling, accessible, and current introduction for students and general readers.
Part of a series called “Contesting the Past,” this even-handed study is by a Canadian academic who has spent his whole career researching and teaching the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict.